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Mary R. Bowman

A Darker Ignorance:
C. S. Lewis and the Nature of the Fall
Mary R. Bowman
Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring
impurity much rather: that which purifies is trial, and trial is by
what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling
in the contemplation o f evil, and knows not the utmost that vice
promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not
a pure. (Milton, Areopagitica 728-29)
the recent publication o f the last volume in Philip Pullman’s H is
D ark Materials trilogy, C. S. Lewis has received a new wave o f publicity—
largely negative— as numerous articles and interviews have recorded Pullman’s
dislike o f Lewis’s work, especially the Narnia series. While his opinions are to a
large extent a matter of taste and to that extent not matter for scholarly concern,
some of his remarks reflect interpretations o f Lewis’s work that merit further
exploration.
One issue that comes up repeatedly in Pullman’s comments is the absence of
Susan from the “inner” Narnia where the rest o f the English visitors to Narnia
find themselves reunited at the conclusion o f The Last Battle. Pullman objects
mightily to Susan’s “exclusion” and what it seems to imply about Lewis’s attitudes
toward adulthood. Susan, he claims, “is shut out from salvation because she is
doing what every other child who has ever been born has done— she is beginning
to sense the developing changes in her body and its effect on the opposite sex”
(qtd. in Eccleshare). In Pullman’s interpretation, the adult nature of Susan’s interests
is the crucial point, and her being “shut out” reflects Lewis’s profound disapproval,
even horror, o f maturation: “he turns away in horror, explicitly with horror, from
the process o f growing up.” This disapproval, moreover, has a clear religious source
and significance: ‘“In other words, she’s growing up. She’s entering adulthood,’
says Pullman. ‘Now this for Lewis, was something [...] so dreadful and so redolent
o f sin that he had to send her to Hell’” (qtd. in Wartofsky). “What he’s saying,”
Pullman concludes, “is that growing up is something we must avoid at all costs,
W
ITH
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that w hen you grow up you fall into the clutches of, well, lipstick and nylons,
w hich m eans sexuality, w hich m eans Satan [. . .]” (Pullman).
I will eventually argue that this interpretation is m isguided, b u t it is a valuable
one to consider, n o t only because it has appeared so frequently in the popular
press, but also because it raises im portant issues in Lewis’s w ork and brings together
elem ents that criticism has n o t often connected. This interpretation is, in fact, a
viable one, b u t it takes certain statem ents out o f context and, m ore significantly,
relies o n certain crucial assum ptions: assum ptions about the nature o f sin, the
nature o f the original prohibition, and about the incom patibility o f w isdom w ith
innocence. Readers familiar with Pullm an’s His Dark Materials fiction will recognize
a consistency betw een his com m ents o n Lewis and the cosm ology that inform s his
ow n books, and while it is n o t my purpose here to debate the theological issues
them selves, I subm it th at it is essential in interpreting (and evaluating) Lewis’s
fiction to attem pt, at least, to identify the theological assum ptions im plicit w ithin
that fiction. (Indeed, it w ould be interesting to com pare the tw o cosmologies,
though it lies beyond the scope o f my present project.) W hat will em erge is that
Lewis disagrees n o t simply on w hether the Fall was a fortunate one (I believe he
does disagree w ith Pullm an here) o r on the necessity o f grow ing up (I believe his
view actually has m uch in com m on with Pullm an’s), b u t o n those fundam ental
assum ptions about innocence, sin, and maturity. Follow ing Pullm an’s lead, my
m ain concern will be with the N arnia series, but elucidating these assum ptions
will take me into other works, notably Perelandra.

Such prohibitions bind not
P ullm an’s ow n assum ptions a b o u t the nature o f sin and its relationship to
maturity— the assum ptions that largely drive his reading o f Susan’s exclusion from
paradise— are spelled out in som e detail in a W isconsin Public Radio interview.
F or him, “ sin consists largely o f curiosity, o r curiosity is largely the em bodim ent
o f sin” ; the first sin, “the initial ro o t o f all [other sins, . . . ] was curiosity. T he
serpent said, taste this and you’ll see w hat good and evil are like. So [Eve] did, and
those things all came o u t o f her initial sin o f curiosity. T h a t’s w here it all began,
and th at’s w hat the W estern Church has been saying for a long tim e” (Pullman).
In other w ords, the Genesis account reference to the “tree o f the knowledge o f
good and evil” (Gen. 2.17, KJV) m eans that the tree literally contains, or directly
represents, this knowledge, and it was precisely desire for this knowledge that led
Eve to transgress.
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M oreover, fo r Pullm an, knowledge such as th at obtained from the forbidden
tree is critical to hum an developm ent; the inseparability o f knowledge and sin, in
his reading o f G enesis, renders sin an absolute prerequisite for m aturity. T hough
innocence is lost, th at loss is a necessary step tow ard growth:
The way I see it is that the loss— and it is a loss— o f the innocence and the grace that we
are born with, is something that’s a necessary stage that we all have to go through, and far
from lamenting it, we should welcome it, we should accept it as a necessary stage, and we
should then go on to the next part o f our development, because human beings in the
middle part o f their lives, as we are, are on a sort of spectrum, on a sort of ladder if you
like, a spectrum that leads from the innocence of childhood, if we are lucky, to, at the
other end, wisdom. (Pullman)
Crucial here is the idea that this w isdom cannot be com bined w ith innocence, and
could n o t have been gained w ithout the Fall: “ [T]he p oint is that innocence, we
have to leave it behind. Innocence cannot be wise. [...] A nd furtherm ore, w isdom
cannot be innocent.”
In short, thinks Pullm an, the Prohibition was specifically a prohibition to
know and therefore a prohibition to m ature, and its violation was necessary before
hum anity could explore and develop its full potential. In this sense Pullman regards
the Fall as a felix culpa, a “ fortunate fall.” (Though he uses the term in the W PR
interview, he makes it clear th at the happiness o f the fall lies in the hum an grow th
that it enabled; his idea o f the felix culpa thus differs from the traditional idea,
which em phasizes the miracles that it inspired: the Incarnation and Resurrection.)
Implicit in this interpretation is the additional assum ption that the Prohibition
was perm anent. W hen Steve Paulson suggests “that if E ve had never taken a bite
from the apple, if she had never developed that self-consciousness, that knowingness
betw een good and evil, then we w ould be nothing today, we w ould be living in
som e state o f innocence that w ould be totally dull,” Pullm an concurs: “T h at’s the
clear im plication o f the story. W e w ould still be pets. W e w ould still be children”
(Pullman). W ithout disobedience, hum an beings w ould never have acquired
knowledge o f good and evil, and thereby w isdom and maturity.
Pullm an reads the Prohibition, in fact, m uch as M ilton’s Satan does, and as
his Eve does after she has begun to accept Satan’s argum ents. In Paradise Lost, it is
Satan w ho takes the Prohibition to m ean that “ ‘Know ledge [is] forbidd’n ’” and
that it is ‘“ sin to know ’” (4.515, 517) and w ho assum es that the rule prevents
developm ent, being “‘invented with design / T o keep them low w hom Knowledge
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might exalt / Equal with Gods’” (4.524-6). He succeeds in persuading Eve that
the injunction is unjust and therefore not to be obeyed: ‘“what forbids he but to
know,’” she concludes moments before taking the fatal bite, “‘Forbids us good,
forbids us to be wise? / Such prohibitions bind not’” (9.758-60). But Milton
himself elsewhere suggests that it is even now possible for “virtue” to “kno[w...]
the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejec[t] it,” that it is possible to
“see and know, and yet abstain” (Areopagitica 728-29).
Lewis, good Miltonist that he was, sees things much more as Milton does.
(And he dismisses the Blakean notion that Satan is the true hero o f Paradise host
as “wholly erroneous,” Preface 94.) While Pullman’s theological views shape his
own fiction, and rightly so, any commentary on Lewis’s fiction that treats such
ideas as a given is highly susceptible to error, for Lewis disagrees with Pullman on
these fundamental assumptions. For Lewis, the Prohibition was not about
knowledge at all; it was not permanent; far from being a bar to wisdom, it was a
vehicle to it; and mature wisdom is absolutely compatible with innocence— or
would have been in an unfallen world.
Different laws in different worlds

In his own analysis o f Paradise L ost, Lewis takes pains to emphasize his
understanding that for Milton (as for Augustine before him), the Prohibition was
arbitrary; the point of the forbidding was to give Adam and Eve an opportunity to
obey God in a meaningful way— not to keep anything of particular importance
from them:
All idea of a magic apple has fallen out of sight. [. . .] The idea that the apple has any
intrinsic importance is put into the mouths of bad characters. [. . .] Satan assumes that
knowledge is magically contained in the apple and will pass to the eater whether those
who have forbidden the eating wish or no (IX, 721 et seq.). Good characters speak quite
differently. For them the apple is ‘sole pledge o f his obedience’ (IV, 428) [...]. The view
that if the apple has no intrinsic magic then the breach of the prohibition becomes a small
matter—in other words that the Miltonic God is making a great pother about nothing—
is expressed only by Satan. [...] St. Augustine considers the disobedience heinous precisely
because obedience was so easy. (Preface 68-69)

The Fall, consequently, had nothing to do with the acquisition o f knowledge
per se: “The Fall is simply and solely Disobedience— doing what you have been
told not to do: and it results from Pride— from being too big for your boots,
forgetting your place, thinking that you are God” (70-71). The tree is called “the
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tree o f knowledge” not because it contains knowledge in itself or even because
desire for knowledge leads to eating it, but because knowledge o f good and evil
necessarily follows from the act o f disobedience: Milton says elsewhere that “[i]t
was called the tree o f knowledge o f good and evil from the event”— “event” here
carrying its Latin meaning “outcome” (Christian Doctrine 993). Lewis does not
comment on this point specifically in the Preface, but it will become evident in his
fiction that he follows Milton on this point as well.
The understanding o f the Prohibition that Lewis so clearly explicates in
Milton’s poem appears in his own fictional temptations. In The Magician's Nephew,
Digory is sent to bring an apple from a distinctly Miltonic garden. The garden sits
at the top o f a “steep green hill” (156) and is bound by a “high wall o f green turf’
with “high gates o f gold, fast shut, facing east” (157). These few details already
echo Milton’s paradise, which sits at the top o f “a steep wilderness, whose hairy
sides / With thicket overgrown, grotesque and wild, / Access deni’d” (P L 4.13537); and which has “One Gate [...] only [...] and that look’d East” (4.178). The
importance o f Paradise Lost as a pretext becomes even more pronounced after
Digory enters the garden through the gates, as the inscription on them instructs
(“Come in by the gold gates or not at all” [Magician’s 157]), and discovers that the
witch Jadis has arrived there before him. Digory “guessed at once that she must
have climbed in over the wall” (159-60), in defiance o f the instructions and in
clear imitation o f Satan, who
Due entrance [. . .] disdain’d, and in contempt,
At one slight bound high overleap’d all bound
O f Hill or highest Wall, and sheer within
Lights on his feet. (PL 4.180-83)

She has also eaten one o f the apples, as the Satan-possessed serpent claims to have
done (9.575-612), again in violation o f the directive on the gates (“Take o f my
fruit for others or forbear”).
Thus, although the scene lacks the primal force o f the Edenic temptation
because Digory is not the progenitor of his race, it is patterned after the earlier
scene and, at least on an individual level, is infused with the same drama. It is
therefore significant that neither the tree itself nor the temptation has anything to
do with knowledge. Aslan assigns no such meaning to the fruit; Digory is told
rather that it is needed to plant a tree that will “protect” Narnia from the witch
(Magician’s Nephew 142). Digory is tempted at first by the mere look and smell of
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the apple, not by any metaphysical powers it may possess: “he couldn’t help looking
at it and smelling it before he put it away. [...] A terrible thirst and hunger came
over him and a longing to taste that fruit” (158). It is the witch herself who identifies
the inherent power o f the fruit, which imparts not knowledge, but eternal life: “‘It
is the apple o f youth, the apple o f life. [. . .] Eat it, [.. .] and you and I will both
live forever and be king and queen o f this whole world’” (161). Neither eternal life
nor worldly power proves to be very tempting to Digory, so Jadis appeals to his
fear o f losing his dangerously ill mother: ‘“But what about this Mother o f yours
whom you pretend to love so? [. . . ] [O]ne bite of that apple would heal her’”
(161). It is only this last appeal which presents a genuine temptation for Digory,
a “most terrible choice” (162).
Lewis’s belief in the arbitrary nature o f the Prohibition is clearly reflected in
this scene, for the seemingly essential details of the Edenic situation are altered.
The forbidden fruit is associated not with knowledge, but with life, and Digory is
tempted not by curiosity but by a child’s desire not to lose his mother. The test is
one o f trust, as C. N. Manlove has explained:
The act that Digory must carry out is one o f obedience. His errors before were o f selfwill: he would determine the future and bring it to pass. That is the temptation himself
and then the Witch put before him at the garden: why should he trust Aslan, why should
he not take another apple for himself, why should he not use the apple he has plucked to
help his sick mother rather than take it back for Aslan’s uncertain purposes? He refuses:
he gives himself back into Aslan’s hand. (176)

It becomes even clearer that Lewis regards the specifics of the Prohibition as
inessential surface features when we turn to Perelandra, which even more directly
than The Magician’s Nephew explores the nature of the Prohibition, o f sin, and
obedience. There, the Prohibition does not involve fruit at all, but land: the Lord
and Lady o f Venus are commanded to spend their nights on the floating islands
only; they may visit the fixed lands only during the daytime. The Lady herself
observes the accidental nature of the rule when she learns that this particular
prohibition never applied on Earth: ‘“There can, then, be different laws in different
worlds’” (74). Margaret P. Hannay, in her seminal analysis of the influence of
Paradise Lost on Perelandra, relates this important detail to Lewis’s comments in
the Preface to Paradise Lost (quoted above) rejecting the notion o f a “magic apple”
(86). And it is clear that there is nothing inherently sinful or dangerous about the
fixed lands. As Manlove observes, “[d]uring the temptation [...] it is actually one
of Ransom’s strongest arguments that the prohibition should have no inherent
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significance at all, save that Maledil forbids it” (68). The Lady herself comes to
understand that the temptation is, fundamentally, about trust:
“The reason for not yet living on the Fixed Land is now so plain. How could I wish to live
there except because it was Fixed? And why should I desire the Fixed except to make
sure—to be able on one day to command where I should be the next and what should
happen to me? It was to reject the wave—to draw my hands out of Maleldil’s, to say to
Him, ‘Not thus, but thus’—to put in our own power what times should roll toward us .
.. as if you gathered fruits together to-day for to-morrow’s eating instead of taking what
came. That would have been cold love and feeble trust.” (208)
In his fiction Lewis repeatedly follows Milton in making disobedience not an
expression o f curiosity but a lack o f trust, a not allowing God to be God.
What would have happened

An equally significant aspect o f the Prohibition as Lewis understands it is that it
was never meant to be permanent. The Lady o f Perelandra implies this in her
explication of the Prohibition: “The reason for noty e t living on the Fixed Land is
now so plain,”’ she begins (208, emphasis added); “yet” suggests a temporary
restraint. After the temptation is successfully resisted, her obedience and trust
tested and proven true, the rules are changed, and the Lord and Lady not only are
permitted to live on the Fixed Land but are given complete dominion over the
planet. Ransom comes to understand that “this island had never been forbidden
them, and that one purpose in forbidding the other had been to lead them to this
their destined throne” (203-04).
In the same way, Digory’s temptation is about deciding the when and where
for himself; he is not to be denied help for his mother entirely. Aslan explains to
Digory and Polly that the “sin” or “fall” o f Jadis has to do with intention and
timing: the fruit is now “a horror to her” because
“That is what happens to those who pluck and eat fruits at the wrong time and in the
wrong way. The fruit is good, but they loathe it ever after.”
[••••]

“Things always work according to their nature. She has won her heart’s desire; she has
unwearying strength and endless days like a goddess. But length of days with an evil heart
is only length of misery and already she begins to know it. All get what they want: they do
not always like it.” (Magician's 174)
It is made clear to Digory that he risked the same horror himself when he
considered yielding to the witch’s temptation: “‘Understand, then, that it would
68
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have healed [your mother]; but not to your joy or hers. The day would have come
when both you and she would have looked back and said it would have been
better to die in that illness”’ (175). But it is immediately made equally clear that
the crucial factor in such an event was the lack o f permission, not the apple itself,
for Aslan continues: ‘“That is what would have happened, child, with a stolen
apple. It is not what will happen now. What I give you now will bring joy. It will
not, in your world, give endless life, but it will heal’” (175). Having resisted the
temptation to take an apple without permission, Digory is rewarded with exactly
what had tempted him: his mother’s return to health.
In this way Lewis demonstrates that the Prohibition was not a permanent ban
on anything o f value: knowledge, life, or anything else. Nor did it impose stasis.
Rather, it is the beginning o f a process. One o f the most original and fascinating
aspects o f Perelandra especially is its exploring the question “what would have
happened if Eve had said no?” As John S. Tanner puts it, “Perelandra envisions
the prospect of progress without a fall” (131). In this Lewis is once again following
Milton’s lead. Milton’s Raphael describes for Adam the possibility of growth that
is available to humankind as long as “ye be found obedient” (P L 5.501):
[. . .] time may come when men
With Angels may participate, and [. . .]

[................................................................ ]
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,
Improv’d by tract o f time, and wing’d ascend
Ethereal, as wee, or may at choice
Here or in Heav’nly Paradises dwell. (5.493-500)
Lewis cites this same passage in discussing one of the many points of agreement
between Milton and Augustine: “If there had been no Fall, the human race after
multiplying to its full numbers would have been promoted to angelic status (De
Civ. Dei, XIV, 10). Milton agrees” (Preface 68).
Instead o f a permanent barrier, then, the Prohibition and the resisted
temptation present something more like a crossroads, from which two roads lead
to the same desired good— knowledge, mother’s health, a settled home— but in
very different ways. As the Lady puts it, Ransom arrived ‘“at that day when the
time of our being young drew to its end, and from it we must now go up or go
down, into corruption or into perfection’” (208). Development o f some kind
would necessarily follow; the issue is o f what kind. And though the Perelandrian
prohibition and temptation did not mention “the knowledge o f good and evil” at
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all, the K ing m akes it clear that, on V enus as on E arth, knowledge follows from
either choice, “ from the event,” in M ilton’s term s. T he unfallen do n o t continue
ignorant o f good and evil; quite the opposite: through their obedience they have
acquired knowledge superior to w hat they w ould have gained had they disobeyed,
and indeed superior to w hat hum ans on fallen E arth have. T he K ing explains,
“We know these things now. [....] We have learned of evil, though not as the Evil
One wished us to learn. We have learned better than that, and know it more, for it is
waking that understands sleep and not sleep that understands waking. There is an ignorance
of evil that comes from being young: there is a darker ignorance that comes from doing
it, as men by sleeping lose the knowledge of sleep. You are more ignorant o f evil in
Thulcandra now than in the days before your Lord and Lady began to do i t But Maleldil
has brought us out of the one ignorance, and we have not entered the other.” (209)
O nce again a passage o f M ilton’s lies behind Lewis’s: A dam him self m akes it
clear that there is som ething im paired about the know ledge that he and E ve have
gained by their disobedient choice:
“ [. . .] since our Eyes
O p’n’d we find indeed, and find we know
Both Good and Evil, Good lost, and Evil got,
Bad Fruit of Knowledge, if this be to know[.]” (9.1070-73)
As Charles A. H u ttar points out, it is natural for residents o f E a rth to adhere to
the notion that only by a knowledge o f evil can we fully appreciate the good. Since our
whole experience bears witness to this obvious truth, it takes a great effort o f the
imagination, assisted perhaps by rigorous logic, to consider the possible existence of beings
on this or any other world who might know and fully savor good per se, alone, by itself.
(126-27)

Perelandra posits the existence o f just such beings.
A lthough Aslan tells Lucy, m ore than once, th at ‘“no one is ever told w hat
would have hap p en ed "(Voyage
'
136; cf. Prince 137), in b o th The Magician’s Nephew
and Perelandra Lewis allows us a glim pse, albeit indirect, o f w hat m ight have
happened on E arth. H e creates new w orlds, w ith new Prohibitions and new
tem ptations, w here a different choice is m ade.
T oo old for fairy tales
Having eliminated the crucial assum ptions— the Prohibition was about knowledge,
the Fall was about curiosity and therefore was the only path to m aturity and

70

“A darker ignorance”: C. S. Lewis and the Nature o f the Fall
w isdom — as foreign to Lewis’s conception, let us return to the opening question
o f Susan’s status at the end o f The Last Battle. I f know ledge and grow th are n o t
inseparably linked to sin, why w ould Susan’s growing up exclude her from salvation?
First o f all, we should be m ore precise ab o u t Susan’s degree o f m aturity.
Pullm an states unequivocally that Susan is grow ing up, but the im m ediate context
calls that into question. G ranted, Jill does say th at Susan is ‘“interested in nothing
now-a-days except nylons and lipstick and invitations. She always was a jolly sight
too keen on being grow n-up’” (Last Battle 135). B ut im m ediately Polly— w ho is
considerably older than Susan or Jill and has already lived a full life— contests that
characterization:
“Grown-up, indeed,” said the Lady Polly. “I wish she would grow up. She wasted all
her school time wanting to be the age she is now, and she’ll waste all the rest of her life
trying to stay that age. Her whole idea is to race on to the silliest time o f one’s life as quick
as she can and then stop there as long as she can.” (135)
T he im plication is that Susan is n o t in p o in t o f fact grow n up, n o r is she grow ing
up in w hat we m ight call an optim al way. She has fixated at a stage along the way,
a stage characterized not only by her interest in adult things, but also by her rejection
of, even disbelief in, w hat she regards as childish things. Says Eustace, “ ‘w henever
you’ve tried to get her to com e and talk about N arnia o r do anything about N arnia,
she says ‘W hat w onderful m em ories you have! Fancy your still thinking about all
those funny games we used to play w hen we were children”” (135). T hough she
has actually been in N arnia herself, she no longer regards it as real.
A n alternate m odel o f the process o f grow ing up is im plied elsewhere in the
N arnia series. A t the end o f Prince Caspian, for exam ple, Peter tells E dm und and
Lucy that he and Susan will n o t be returning to N arnia because “ ‘[Aslan] says
w e’re getting too old’” (215). T hough the idea strikes the younger children as
unbearable (‘“W hat awful bad luck. Can you bear it?” ’ Lucy asks Peter), P eter’s
ow n com m ent suggests that he is acquiring a different understanding: ‘“I t’s all
rather different from w hat I thought. Y ou’ll understand w hen it com es to your
last tim e.’” W hen Lucy and E dm und are them selves “too old” to return to N arnia,
readers are privy' to their conversation w ith Aslan and thus get a fuller picture o f
the transition they are beginning to undergo:
“You are too old, children,” said Aslan, “and you must begin to come close to your
own world now. [. . . T]here I have another name. You must learn to know me by that

Mvthlore 91 Sum m er 2003

71

Mary R. Bowman
name. This w as the very reason w hy you w ere brought to Narnia, that by know in g m e
here for a little, you may know m e better there.” ( Voyage 215-16)

The final words o f Aslan suggest very strongly that the children are n ot expected
to reject or forget N arnia as they grow, b u t they are instead m eant to grow into a
m ore adult understanding o f w ho Aslan is and o f w hat their experiences in N arnia
have taught them , m uch as the K ing and Q ueen o f Perelandra have developed a
m ore m ature understanding o f their ow n innocence w ithout leaving it behind.
W ritings external to the N arnia books suggest that Susan’s current rejection
o f childish things is a norm al part o f grow ing up, b u t significantly, n o t a final
stage. In the dedicatory letter to Lucy Barfield prefaced to The Lion, the Witch and

the Wardrobe, Lewis tells his goddaughter, “ I wrote this story for you, but when I
began it I had not realised that girls grow quicker than books. A s a result you are
already too old for fairy tales, and by the time it is printed and boundyou will be older
still’ (iii). H e confidently expects that the non-fictional Lucy will becom e “ too
old” for N arnia just as her fictional namesake does. Ju st as confidently, however,
he expects this to be a transitional stage, n o t a final destination, for he continues:
“But some day you will be old enough to start reading fairy tales again. You can then
take it down [. . .] and tell me what you think of it.”
Lewis’s view o f growing up is presented still m ore explicitly in his essay “O n
Three Ways o f W riting for Children.” R esponding to the idea that an adult w ho
enjoys fairy tales is to be “scorned and pitied for arrested developm ent,” Lewis
argues that it is the scorners and pitiers w ho are arrested:
Critics w h o treat adult as a term o f approval, instead o f as a m erely descriptive term,
cannot be adult them selves. T o be concerned about bein g grow n up, to admire the grow n
up because it is grow n up, to blush at the suspicion o f being childish; these things are the
marks o f ch ild h ood and adolescence. A nd in ch ild h ood and adolescen ce they are, in
m oderation, healthy sym ptom s. Y oun g things ou ght to w ant to grow . B ut to carry o n
into m iddle life or even into early m anh ood this concern about being an adult is a mark
o f really arrested d evelopm ent. W hen I w as ten, I read fairy tales in secret and w ould
have been asham ed if I had been found d oing so. N o w that I am fifty I read them openly.
W hen I becam e a m an I put away childish things, including the fear o f childishness and
the desire to be very grow n up. (25)

Though this essay preceded The L ast Battle by a few years, the passage could very
well be describing Susan. Peter, Digory, and Polly— all older than Susan but still
believers in Narnia and Aslan— have presumably m oved past the stage o f dismissing
their childhood experiences as “ funny games,” b ut Susan has not.
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Lewis continues by characterizing grow ing up as a process o f accretion rather
than replacem ent:
[S]urely arrested development consists not in refusing to lose old things but in failing to
add new things? [....] I now enjoy Tolstoy and Jane Austen and Trollope as well as fairy
tales and I call that growth: if I had had to lose the fairy tales in order to acquire the
novelists, I would not say that I had grown but only that I had changed. (25-26)
This accretion is n o t m ere accretion, m oreover, but includes deepened relationships
w ith the “old things” : “I think my grow th is just as apparent w hen I now read the
fairy tales as w hen I read the novelists, for I now enjoy the fairy tales better than I
did in childhood: being now able to p u t m ore in, o f course I get m ore o u t” (26).
It is this accretive type o f grow th th at Peter, Lucy, and E d m u n d (and Lucy
Barfield) are expected to achieve: “ to com e close to [their] ow n w orld” and “to
know [Aslan] better there” ; “ to start reading fairy tales again.” A nd it is this m odel
w hich Susan resists: she has “ race[d]” to her current adolescent state and wants to
“ ‘stop there as long as she can.’” N ylons and lipstick and invitations have n o t been
added to her other interests and tastes, b u t have replaced them : ‘“ she’s interested
in nothing now -a-days except nylons and lipstick and in v itations’” (Last Battle
135, emphasis added). As R obert H ouston Smith puts it, “ [f|or Susan, being grow n
up m eans regarding G od, beauty, and im agination as w orthless fantasies” (176).
It is not, o f course, my purpose to argue for o r against any particular m odel o f
grow th; one is at liberty to consider Lewis dead w rong on this score. W hat m ust
be recognized, how ever, is that w ithin Lewis’s understanding o f w hat it is to be
grow n up, Susan has a very long way to go yet, and the sentence that for Pullm an
m arks her as the m o st grow n-up o f the group w ould, from Lewis’s perspective,
m ark her rather as the m o st im m ature.
Indeed, from Lewis’s ow n com m ents on the m eaning o f grow ing up, we can
see that he actually agrees w ith Pullm an o n an im portant point: that “the loss o f
the innocence [. . .] th at we are b o rn with, is som ething th at’s a necessary stage
that we all have to go through, and [ . . . ] we should accept it as a necessary stage,
and we should then go o n to the next part o f ou r developm ent” (Pullman). W here
they disagree is on the nature o f that stage, precisely w hat losses it entails, and
w hether lipstick and nylons are an adequate synecdoche for it. W ere it n o t for
fifty years’ anticipation, Lewis m ight alm ost be replying to Pullman:
It is, of course, true that the process o f growing does, incidentally and unfortunately,
involve some more losses. But that is not the essence of growth, certainly not what makes
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growth admirable or desirable. [....] Some critics seem to confuse growth with the cost
o f growth and also to wish to make that cost far higher than, in nature, it need be.
(“Three Ways” 26)

N oth in g o f the child about it
T he question o f Susan’s apparent m aturity has been w orth spending som e time
o n because o f the crucial issue o f the relationship betw een m aturity and loss o f
innocence. W hile in a fallen w orld grow ing up does entail som e losses and a kind
o f innocence m ay be am ong them , the n o tio n that a prelapsarian innocence was
necessarily childlike and ignorant is one th at Lewis directly dismisses.
E v e n w ithin the N arn ia b o o k s there is an adm ixture o f childhood and
adulthood in the children that m ight call such an assum ption into question, though
this is n o t an issue dealt w ith centrally in these books. M anlove rem arks (with
disapproval) th at “ Lewis, basically, w ants his children to behave like adults. They
are to grow up spiritually [. . .] b u t also they are to learn to m anage their world. [.
. . ] W e have to see them at once as children and as ‘grow n-up’ in relation to
N arn ia” (122-23). W hile M anlove regards this as a flaw (“In asking us to believe
in his children b o th as children and as adults, Lewis is som etim es in danger o f
forfeiting ou r belief in them as either” 123), it m ight also suggest that Lewis held
less firmly than som e to the idea th at being a child and having adult responsibilities
are contradictory.
Looking outside the N arnia series, we can see Lewis addressing this issue m ore
directly, notably in his com m ents o n M ilton’s prelapsarian innocents, and in their
V enusian counterparts. In fact, he describes the experience o f reading Paradise

Lost as having jolted him o u t o f the co m m o n preconception o f A dam and E v e’s
childishness. H e “had com e to the poem ,” he reports, with just such an expectation,
“associating innocence w ith childishness” and “hop[ing] to be show n [Adam and
E v e ’s] inarticulate delight in a new w orld w hich they w ere spelling out letter by
letter, to hear them prattle.” In so doing, he states, he was expecting “ som ething
w hich M ilton never intended to give and w hich, if he had given it, w ould have
gratified a som ew hat com m onplace taste in m e and w ould have been hardly
consistent w ith the story he had to tell.” H aving rid him self o f these preconceptions,
Lewis com es to conclude th at “ [t]he w hole p o in t ab o u t A dam and Eve is that, as
they w ould never, b u t for sin, have been old, so they w ere never young, never
im m ature o r undeveloped. T hey w ere created full-grow n and perfect’ (Preface
116).
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This idea th at paradisal innocence and even inexperience are coupled w ith
adult intelligence and judgm ent becom es a key elem ent in the depiction o f the
Lady o f Perelandra. W hat M anlove observes b u t regrets in the N arnia children is
m ade explicit in the Lady: she is a m ixture o f the childlike and the adult, unknow n
on the fallen E arth, as revealed in her reaction to one o f her learning experiences:
“A t this p o in t she clasped her hands and a smile such as R ansom had never seen
changed her. O n e does n o t see th at smile here except in children, b u t there was
nothing o f the child about it there” (61). A nd as critics have o ften observed, she is
n o t the naive child o f Lewis’s pre-M ilton expectations, b u t rather, as W ayne
Shum aker describes her, “a creature w ithout m uch experience o f life b u t endow ed
w ith enorm ous intellectual pow er” (61). Similarly, M anlove observes a m ature
intellect at w ork during the tem ptation th at coexists w ith her innocence:
She is both guilelessly trusting and intellectually rigorous during the temptation: though
she trusts both to be speaking the truth and, knowing nothing of evil [. . .], cannot
perceive the moral difference between the arguers and their arguments, she is at the same
time o f a razor-sharp lucidity that demands that a case made be thoroughly water-tight.
(61)
O n e o f the striking consequences o f this com bination o f m oral innocence
with intellectual maturity is the Lady’s ability to learn, w ithout the loss o f innocence.
W e have already seen that she can acquire the know ledge o f good and evil by
resisting tem ptation better than by succum bing to it, but even before the tem ptation
begins we observe her grow th, a process th at she repeatedly describes as ‘“getting
older.’” This is a m uch-discussed aspect o f Perelandra b u t one w o rth briefly
reviewing here. From her first conversation w ith Ransom , she is exposed n o t only
to new ideas and new inform ation about o th er w orlds, b u t to new perspectives on
her ow n experience and knowledge she already has. As R obert F. Brow n puts it,
Ransom “unintentionally becom es an agent accelerating her m aturation in selfconsciousness” (56). She perceives the passage o f time in a new way, ‘“seeing how
a day has one appearance as it com es to you, and another w hen you are in it, and
a third w hen it has gone p ast’”— an insight she describes as “ ‘great w isdom ’”
(Perelandra 60). She becom es aware for the first tim e o f her possession o f free will:
“ ‘this [. . .] is the glory and w onder you have m ade m e see; that it is I, I myself,
w ho turn from the good expected to the given good. O u t o f my ow n heart I do it.
O ne can conceive a heart w hich did n o t [ . . . ] . I th o u g h t that I was carried in the
will o f Him I love, but now I see that I walk w ith it’” (69). In fact, it is this early
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grow th and m aturing understanding o f her obedience to the Prohibition that helps
her resist the tem ptation once it begins:
“This makes me older far [. ..]. We cannot walk out o f Maleldil’s will: but He has given
us a way to walk out of our will. And there could be no such way except a command like
this. [ . . . . ] I knew there was joy in looking upon the Fixed Island and laying down all
thought o f ever living there, but I did not till now understand.” (118)
T hus although the Lady is never imm ature, she can, and does, becom e more
m ature th an w hen she started. T h e U n-m an observes as m uch in his attem pt to
convince her th a t disobedience will further the process:
“He is making you older— making you to learn things not straight from Him but by
your own meetings with other people and your own questions and thoughts. [. ..] He is
making you a full woman, for up till now you were only half made— like the beasts who
do nothing o f themselves.” (105)
This is a tem p ter’s strategy, b u t like so m any o f his argum ents, it is based o n an
elem ent o f truth, as R ansom recognizes:
Certainly it must be part of the Divine plan that this happy creature should mature,
should become more and more a creature o f free choice, should become, in a sense, more
distinct from God and from her husband in order thereby to be at one with them in a
richer fashion. In fact, he had seen this very process going on from the moment at which
he met her, and had, unconsciously, assisted it. This present temptation, if conquered,
would itself be the next, and greatest, step in the same direction: an obedience freer, more
reasoned, more conscious than any she had known before, was being put in her power.
(133)
This increased w isdom , o f course, is also perilous, as the U n-m an’s ability to
use it in his tem ptation show s, b u t it is im p o rtan t to be clear that for Lewis it is
the danger o f losing innocence, n o t the loss itself, th at is integrally linked to
m aturity.

Conclusion: the great divorce
Susan’s interest in “grow n u p ” things is therefore n o t inherently sinful, any m ore
than it is necessarily d ependent o n rejecting her childhood interests and beliefs.
W hy then is she, apparently, shut ou t o r excluded from H eaven, and consigned to
Hell? T he crucial thing for Lewis is that she does it to herself, that it is a choice she
makes. A fter all, Peter says that Susan ‘“is no longer a friend o f N arnia’” (Last
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Battle 134), n o t that N arnia or Aslan is no longer a friend o f Susan. Like the first
parents on Perelandra, Susan has reached “ that day w hen the tim e o f [her] being
young drew to its end, and from it [she] m ust now go up o r go dow n” (208); the
Perelandrians chose one path, Susan the other.
In a sense she is like the dwarfs. She is n o t present in the stable because o f her
lack o f belief; the dwarfs, though they are actually in the stable, cannot see w hat it
really is, cannot see or hear Aslan, cannot taste the food and drink he provides:
evidence, Aslan tells Lucy, o f ‘“w hat I can, and w hat I cannot, d o ’” (147), a perverse
testam ent to the dw arfs’ free will. Lewis is no Calvinist; grace is n o t irresistible. I f
Susan no longer believes in Aslan, even Aslan cannot save her. Like the dwarfs, she
has ‘“chosen cunning,”’ or in her case nylons, “ ‘instead o f belief. T heir prison is
only in their ow n m inds, yet they are in that prison’” (148); and in this, as R obert
Smith has suggested, both dwarfs and adolescent hum an resem ble the residents o f
Hell in The Great Divorce (176, 199).
But Susan’s ultim ate destiny is n o t known: though the others were killed in a
railway accident, Susan was not there— ironically, because o f her very lack o f interest
in N arnia. She is, therefore, n o t (yet) in Hell; the only logical conclusion is that
she is alive and well back in England. H er father and m other, w ho by coincidence
were on the same train (138), have arrived safely in the “real” or “inner” England,
though they have never heard o f N arnia and are presum ably quite adult: Peter,
E dm und, and Lucy can see them “waving back at them across the great, deep
valley” (182). W hether Susan ever joins them will be determ ined by her ow n
choices; she has her whole life ahead o f her, with time finally to grow up indeed.
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